



Cold War Times

The Internet Newsletter for the Cold War Museum

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About the Cold War Museum

Founded in 1996 by Francis Gary Powers, Jr. and John C. Welch, the Cold War Museum is dedicated to preserving Cold War history and honoring Cold War Veterans.

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Cold War Museum Update

Francis Gary Powers, Jr.

Dear Friends of the Cold War Museum,

I am pleased to report that the Cold War Museum is making great progress. Within the last several weeks many wonderful developments have occurred that have helped the museum.

Virginia General Assembly (HJ 249) - In January Delegate Chap Peterson introduced legislation in support of the Cold War Museum locating at the Lorton Nike Missile base. Delegate Dave Albo was a co-sponsor. It passed the General Laws Committee and is now before a Senate Committee. We are optimistic that it will pass the Senate Committee and will pass when introduced on the floor. If you live in Virginia, please call your State Senators and Delegates and let them know that you support HJ 249 in support of the Cold War Museum. On a side note Delegate Vince Callahan introduced a budget amendment for the museum in the amount of \$100,000. However, due to the economic condition in Virginia, it may be difficult to get this budget amendment passed.

Support from the President of Romania -

The President of Romania, Ion Iliescu, has pledged formal support to the Cold War Museum. During a recent visit to Washington, DC, President Iliescu announced that, "Romanian authorities decided to offer a donation of several important documents, films and archives reflecting the history of my country in that

period. These documents concern two important landmarks of the Cold War in Europe: the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Russian-led Warsaw Pact troops." We are delighted that President Iliescu is in support of the museum and we are looking forward to working with the Embassy of Romania on a reception to be held later this year.

Washington, DC Civil Defense Headquarters -

On February 15 we met with officials of the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency in Lorton , Virginia at the site of the former Civil Defense Headquarters located one mile from the former Nike Missile Base. We are in negotiations with them to preserve Civil Defense maps, documents, and fallout shelter supplies from that location.

Cold War Veteran Association -

The Cold War Veterans Association is based in a suburb of Kansas City and located online at www.coldwarveterans.com. We are in talks with the Founder, Vince Milum, on ways that our two organizations can work together.

Lecture at Richmond Aviation Museum -

On Thursday February 21, 2002 I presented a lecture on the U-2 Incident and Cold War Museum at the Richmond Aviation Museum near the airport.

Ed Pope Book Signing Lecture -

On April 3, 2002 the Cold War Museum will host its next book-signing lecture with Ed Pope, the first American to be tried for espionage in Russia since Francis Gary Powers. To learn more about Ed Pope and his book, "Torpedoed," visit www.edmondpoppe.com.

Annual Golf Tournament in May -

Plans are underway to host our annual golf outing in early May at Ft. Belvoir in Virginia. Last year's tournament was a great success and we are looking forward to a repeat performance this year.

Artifact Donations -

During January the Cold War Museum received a Stasi prison door and cot from Berlin, Germany. In addition, we were notified by the United States Postal Service that they would donate to the Cold War Museum the mailbox used by Aldrich Ames to contact his Soviet handlers. The Stasi prison Door and the mailbox will be on loan to the International Spy Museum until the Lorton Nike site becomes available.

Spies of Washington Tour (www.spytour.com) -

We are excited about the growth and popularity of our Spy Tour and are continuing our public tours again this year starting on March 30. Please note that the tour guide we contract with to run the Spies of Washington Tour is a licensed and registered tour guide. By law, all tours conducted within the District of Columbia must be run by a certified tour guide. Don't be fooled by the more expensive and shorter knock-off version of our tour, which is organized by a private company that does not use licensed guides. All proceeds from the original Spies of Washington Tour are donated directly to the Cold War Museum, which helps with our mission to preserve Cold War history and honor Cold War veterans.

Storage Facility -

The museum is in need of additional storage space in the Northern Virginia area. Because of the growth of our collection over the last year, our storage facility has almost reached full capacity. If you know of any storage space that may be available, please let the Cold War Museum know. Despite our recent developments and progress, the work has just begun and we need to count on your continued support. Please plan to renew your annual membership with the Cold War Museum. Your annual membership will help us plan for the new physical location. Tax-deductible contributions and artifact donations to the Museum will ensure that future generations will remember Cold War events and personalities that forever altered our understanding of national security, international relations, and personal sacrifice for one's country.

Please help spread the word about the Museum.

Together we can make this vision a reality.

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Random Thoughts on the Cold War...

Bryan J Dickerson, Editor

Once again we have endeavored to bring compelling and interesting stories about the Cold War as well as news and information related to Cold War issues. As Gary mentioned above, the Cold War Museum / Cold War Times newsletter is forging an alliance with the Cold War Veterans Association. CWVA will become a regular feature of *CWT* beginning with this issue. Irene Willhite of the Redstone Museum examines the U.S. Army's failed Sgt. York / DIVAD air-defense weapons system. PhDr. Vladislav Kratky of the Skoda Museum writes about the transfer of the Czechoslovak armaments industry east to Slovak lands near the Soviet Union. In our Cold War Tourist section, our Contributing Editor Bill Craig takes us to the Greenbrier Resort in West Virginia, located beneath which was a super secret nuclear command shelter for Congress during the Cold War. Donald Slutzky sheds light upon the U.S. Air Force's Texas Tower off-shore radar installations which guarded against surprise attacks upon America's east coast. In another article, Bill Craig examines the capture of USS Pueblo and the imprisonment of her crew by North Korea in 1968.

Other changes are also underway here at *CWT*. The newsletter is currently sent out in a text-only version to its e-mail subscribers and a full-graphics version is posted on our website. A typical issue runs about 1,200 words or so, which is quite a lot of text to send via e-mail. So we are considering condensing the e-mail version down to about 250 to 500 words which would summarize the full version that is posted on the website. Readers could then visit our website to see *CWT* in its entirety. If you would like to weigh in on this proposal, contact me at editor@coldwartimes.com.

We are debuting an experimental feature called "The Cold War Forum," in which we present an issue and ask you the readers to respond with your thoughts and opinions. The topic is "Churchill At Westminster College: Instigating the Cold War or Sounding the Alarm?" The level of responses that we receive from you will determine the success of this experiment. See pages for the Cold War Forum and the related article about Churchill.

Cold War News & Notes**IN MEMORIAM --****AMBASSADOR (Lt. Gen.) VERNON WALTERS**

AMBASSADOR (Lt. General) VERNON WALTERS, Advisory Board Member to the Cold War Museum died February 10th in West Palm Beach at the age of 85. An exceptional linguist (French, Spanish, Italian, German, Dutch , Portuguese and Russian) and compelling speaker and storyteller, Walters translated for top luminaries, such as President Eisenhower and French President De Gaulle as they relaxed at Rambouillet Palace, and Vice President Nixon when his limousine was attacked by a mob in Venezuela in 1958. He had military assignments as an attaché in Italy, Brazil and France, and served in Vietnam, which he regarded as a noble fight against communism (along with many others of the same opinion). He served as the Deputy Director of CIA 1972 to 1976 – the very difficult years of civic anti-Vietnam unrest and the Church committee assault on the intelligence community -- and as its acting director in 1973. During the Reagan Administration, General Walters served as ambassador-at-large 1981-1985, and then as Ambassador to the UN 1985-1988, and finally Ambassador to Germany until 1991. Born in New York, Walters grew up in France and England. He was drafted in the Army in 1941, commissioned, and served in North Africa and Europe before being placed on the staff of General George Marshall. He also served in the White House under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. He had an uncanny ability to be present at major events around the globe, from Korea to the Middle East. He never married. DCI Tenet issued a statement describing General Walters as a “patriot of enormous talent” who led “an exceptionally rich life of service to country and humanity.” It could not be better said.

DOD Says 'No' To Cold War Medal CWT Staff Report

Much to the disappointment of many Cold War veterans, the Department of Defense announced in late January of this year that it will not issue a special medal for Cold War service. A January 23, 2002 story filed by Army News Service quoted Deputy Director of Officer and Enlisted Management Personnel for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Brad Loos as saying, "After careful consideration, it was decided not to create a medal" (see www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Jan2002).

In response to the DOD decision, the Cold War Veterans Association (CWVA) is calling upon Cold War veterans and other interested persons to contact Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their congressmen and senators to urge for the issuance of the Cold War Medal. CWVA is dedicated to advocating for the rights of Cold War vets and promoting the history of the Cold War. CWVA reports that they have spoken with officials of the Department of Defense and that as a result, the DoD is re-considering their decision to not authorize the Cold War Service Medal. [See their website at www.coldwarveterans.com and see related article on page 9.]

CWT has sent an inquiry to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Victoria Clarke asking for clarification about the DoD's decision but had not received a reply by the time of publication.

For updates on the Cold War Medal issue, visit the CWVA website...

www.coldwarveterans.com

Members of Congress have already weighed in with their support of the Cold War Medal. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 sent to President George W. Bush includes a section authorizing the Cold War Service Medal. (See *CWT* Jan. 2002 issue). In early December 2001, Congressman Ron Paul (14th District – Texas) introduced H.R. 3417 which also authorizes a Cold War Medal. The bill is currently in the House Committee on Armed Services.

Cold War Museum, Slovak Embassy Commemorate 10th Anniversary of Cold War's End

by Bryan J Dickerson, CWT Editor

The Embassy of Slovakia hosted the 10th Anniversary of the End of the Cold War Reception at its beautiful new embassy on Tuesday, 15 January 2002. Dignitaries from the United States, and several Eastern European countries gathered together with veterans and friends of the Cold War Museum to reflect upon the events of the Cold War and its aftermath.

The Anniversary of the End of the Cold War Reception has become an annual event since first being conceived and hosted by the Ambassador of Lithuania in 2000. Last year the Embassy of Hungary hosted the event. At this year's reception, officials from the Romanian Embassy offered to host the 2003 Reception. The Embassies of Estonia, Bulgaria and Latvia have also been enthusiastic supporters of the Museum. "We are thrilled to receive the support of former Eastern Bloc countries in our efforts to preserve the history of the Cold War," said Cold War Museum co-founder Francis Gary Powers, Jr.

The event featured three key note speakers: Slovak Ambassador Martin Butora, Thomas Dine - President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc. (RFE/RL), and Gary Powers Jr.

"We need to make sure that future generations know the events and people that influenced and shaped our American way of life," said Powers. He then quoted President John F. Kennedy as saying, "A nation reveals itself not only by the individuals it produces, but also by those it honors---those it remembers."

"As the son of a famous Cold War figure, I grew up with the Cold War," he continued. "The Cold War Museum began for me as a way to honor my father, but it soon took on a greater life and purpose. I am working toward a museum that will honor all the men and women who worked for democracy and freedom during the Cold War."

Thomas Dine outlined the role that RFE/RL played during the Cold War and plays in the present world. "Persons cannot make informed judgments, nor improve the quality of their lives, nor contribute to the well-being of their societies, without access to full and accurate information," he said. "The role of RFE/RL over the last half-century has been to give the peoples living under Soviet totalitarianism that information. In this next half-century, it is our mission to give the peoples living in other dictatorships the tools we gave to you. The most essential of those tools is media freedom -- a free and independent press."

Ambassador Butora began his remarks by quoting from Winston Churchill's famed "Iron Curtain" speech [see related article on p.10] and emphasized that of the countries he named only Czechoslovakia was still democratic at that time. "And it was particularly sad for my country, that in two years, Churchill's words about democracy in Czechoslovakia were no more true," he said. Then he highlighted some of the ways that democracy was suppressed.

"Nevertheless, putting the Cold War into a museum means that we have come a long way," said Butora. "Yes, we had to bring about the change by ourselves, but the help of the West was indispensable. Thanks to this all, we now see all those beautiful cities from Churchill's speech -- Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia -- and also Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Juliana, Zagreb, Belgrade, not mentioning Bratislava -- we see them to be a part of the free world."

Slovakia itself is a creation of the new post-Cold War world. For centuries the Slovak people had been part of several successive empires. Following the First World War, the Slovak people and their lands were combined with the Czechs to form CzechoSlovakia. This national arrangement lasted until the end of 1992 with the exception of a several-year period around the Second World War when the country was partitioned by Nazi Germany. On 1 January 1993, CzechoSlovakia peacefully split into two separate countries: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Their Embassy, located on International Court in north-west Washington, only opened in June 2001.

The reception received a write up by James Morrison in the 21 January 2002 edition of *The Washington Times*. Morrison's "Embassy Row" column covers news relating to the diplomatic missions in Washington.

Cold War Veterans Association

While there are a number of honorable Veterans Service Organizations, there is only one dedicated to exclusively representing the interests of Cold War Veterans –

The Cold War Veterans Association (CWVA).*

The **Mission** of the Cold War Veterans Association is to:

- (1) **Fight** for rights and benefits that Cold War Veterans deserve;
- (2) **Educate** people as to why the Cold War was fought and why vigilance must be maintained; and
- (3) **Provide** a fraternal community for men and women whose patriotism binds them together.

To be eligible for membership, one must have served honorably in the U.S. Armed Forces at some time during the Cold War period (Sept. 2, 1945 – Dec. 26, 1991).

Visit www.coldwarveterans.com , or send e-mail to AssociationHQ@ColdWarVeterans.com

Why a Cold War Medal?

By Dr. Frank Tims

"...The Defense Authorization Act of 2002 recommends that the Secretary of Defense consider authorizing the design and award of the Cold War Service Medal. This recognition is deserved and long overdue. The 'Cold War' was not just an ideological struggle, it was a large-scale military campaign to prevent a third world war through deterrence and military deployments. While many characterize the period 1945-1991 as "peacetime," except for limited wars and expeditions, this misses the point of the large, ongoing military operation that was in fact global..."

Read the rest of Dr. Tims' article on the CWVA website www.coldwarveterans.com

“The Sinews of Peace”: Churchill’s Speech at Westminster College

by Bryan J. Dickerson, CWT Editor

On 5 March 1946, Winston S. Churchill delivered one of his most famous speeches at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Though he covered various aspects of the world situation and Anglo-American relations, he is best remembered for declaring that an “Iron Curtain” had descended across Europe cutting off Eastern Europe from the West and for issuing a warning against Soviet aggressions.

Rather than instigating a Cold War, as some revisionists would have it, Churchill’s speech at Westminster College was a product of the Cold War that had been taking shape between the former anti-Nazi Germany allies for many months. Once Nazi Germany’s inevitable defeat was assured, the suppressed mistrusts and rivalries began to re-assert themselves between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Increasingly, British and American leaders became dismayed and even outraged at Soviet efforts to “Sovietize” those Eastern European countries which they had captured from the Germans. This trend continued unabated well after the German and Japanese surrenders. Britain and American leaders could only watch helplessly as one by one Poland and other Eastern European states fell victim to Soviet communist intrigues.

By the dawning of 1946, many in the West, including Churchill and President Truman, had grown disgusted with Soviet intransigence. But many others still held out hope for post-war cooperation. For a world that had only just emerged from history’s most destructive conflict, the prospects of another such conflict were none too inviting.

Events in February 1946 seemed to herald future Superpower conflict. On 9 February, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin delivered an “election speech” in Moscow in which he lauded the Soviet Union’s victories over Germany and Japan and outlined new Five Year Plans to re-build the war’s destruction. More ominously, however, Stalin declared that the capitalist economic system had caused both World Wars and would inevitably continue to produce

wars. In fact, he predicted a war with the United States in the 1950s. Of course, Stalin declined to mention that his own alliance with Nazi Germany had enabled Hitler to invade Poland and he himself to seize the portions of Poland and Finland, and the Baltic states.

Stalin's accusations blaming the West for World War II mobilized anti-Stalin sentiment in the West. The very next day, President Truman met with Churchill, who happened to be visiting the United States, to discuss a hard-line response. On 22 February, U.S. Charge in Moscow George F. Kennan sent his famed "Long Telegram" in which he explained Soviet behaviors and intentions in terms of inherent cultural and political insecurities and aggressive expansionism. Kennan's assessment was widely disseminated through U.S. diplomatic and military circles and even read by Truman. Five days later, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg called for a policy of resistance against Soviet expansions in a speech on the Senate floor. As 1946 was also a mid-term election year for Congress, such comments undoubtedly had electoral implications. In response, Secretary of State James Byrnes outlined a new get-tough-with-the-Soviets policy the following day.

Thus in the days preceding Churchill's appearance at Westminster College, a variety of forces were combining to escalate tensions between the wartime allies. In addition, a crisis was brewing in the Middle East. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and Iran to settle lingering issues faltered and the Soviets refused to withdraw their troops from northern Iran in accordance with a pre-set date.

The arrangements for Churchill's speaking engagement at Westminster College had been made the preceding fall with Truman playing a role in it. In mid-February Churchill met with Truman to discuss the speech. By this time, it had been decided that the speech would center upon the need for Anglo-American cooperation in preserving world peace. Then on 4 March Churchill accompanied Truman on a special train to Missouri. Though initially not wanting to see the speech beforehand, Truman relented and read it approvingly.

On 5 March, Churchill, Truman and their associates arrived at Westminster College. The whole town and campus were decorated for the occasion and thousands turned out to greet the motorcade and to hear the former British Prime Minister. The President of

Westminster College Dr. Franc L. McCluer spoke first. Then Truman himself introduced Churchill with the words, "I know he will have something constructive to say to the world."

In his speech, Churchill covered several important themes. He reminded America that it stood "at the pinnacle of world power" and of the responsibilities this entailed. He emphasized the importance of the new United Nations organization in maintaining peace. He warned of "the two great dangers" which threaten the world: war and tyranny. He called for an Anglo-American alliance to preserve world peace and resist tyranny.

It was Churchill's comments upon the Soviet Union and the situation in Eastern Europe which drew the most attention. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent," he said.

"Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow."

He then went on to survey how the Soviets were acquiring and consolidating control of these nations and attempting to do so in other parts of the world. But Churchill also denied that the Soviets wanted war and that a war was imminent. "What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines," he said.

The appropriate response, in Churchill's estimation, was a strong alliance of the English-speaking peoples based upon democracy and the principles of the United Nations charter. "From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness," he said. A democratic unity, which he called "the Sinews of Peace," would preserve peace and deter Soviet expansion.

If you would like to read the full text of Churchill's speech, it can be found online at History Out Loud's web site <http://www.hpol.org/churchill/>

Churchill's remarks were very well received by those in attendance, including President Truman. But many others in the United States and in the West were taken somewhat aback by them. Some members of Congress were aghast at the idea of a new Anglo-American alliance. Newspaper editorials criticized Churchill for his hostile remarks about the Soviets and Truman for appearing to approve of them. Stung by such criticism, Truman attempted to distance himself from Churchill's speech and sent Stalin an invitation to speak at the University of Missouri. Of course, Stalin declined Truman's invitation.

On the night of 6 March 1946 Stalin received word of Churchill's speech and Truman's presence at its giving via a cable from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. According to Stalin biographer Dmitri Volkogonov, even the mistrustful Stalin was surprised by the bellicose tone of Churchill's speech. "Churchill's speech was both a signal and a challenge," he wrote.

Not surprisingly, Stalin's response was venomous. In an interview in *Pravda*, Stalin declared that Churchill's statements were comparable with Hitler's racist views. He branded Churchill a warmonger and charged him with attempting to instigate a war with the Soviet Union. Then he warned that the West was certain to lose any war with the Soviet Union.

Within a couple weeks of Churchill's speech, however, public opinion polls in the United States were reporting a hardening of American attitudes against the Soviets. According to the polls, a significant majority of Americans were opposed to Soviet policies and were supportive of a tougher American foreign policy against them.

Though initially attempting to distance himself from Churchill's belligerence and even pacifying Stalin, Truman too began adopting a harder line towards the Soviets. On 10 March, he demanded that the Soviets remove their troops from northern Iran which the Soviets began to do at the end of the month. During the rest of 1946, he confronted the Soviets over war reparations from Germany and peace treaties with the other Axis nations. He also supported Turkey in its disputes with Stalin over the Dardanelles and even sent a carrier task force to the region in the fall. Of course the fact that Truman's actions took place in the context of a Congressional election year cannot be overlooked.

When Winston Churchill spoke at Westminster College, he intended to make a significant impact upon the course of the post-war world. He succeeded. Rather than a cause of the Cold War, his speech was a reaction to its emergence and a major contributor to its development. His words "Iron Curtain" will forever be associated with the Cold War and a part of its lexicon.

Sources:

Winston S. Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace." Address at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri. 5 March 1946.; Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*. ed. and trans. from the Russian by Harold Shukman. NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988.; "Stalin's Reply to Churchill," *New York Times*, (14 March 1946).; David McCullough, *Truman*. NY: Touchstone, 1992.; Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order*. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1994.

Cold War Forum:

Churchill At Westminster College: Instigating the Cold War or Sounding the Alarm?

[Editor's Note: In this experimental section, CWT asks you the readers to weigh in on Cold War controversies. Send your thoughts (2 page maximum) to CWT Editor via e-mail editor@coldwartimes.com or the Cold War Museum postal address. As this is still experimental, we will determine the exact format for publication based upon the nature and amount of responses.]

As mentioned in the preceding article, Churchill's speech has created much controversy ever since he spoke those now famous words. Some contemporaries and historians have chastised him for attempting to provoke the Soviets into confrontation. Others have seen him as a prophet warning of Soviet aggressions. What's your opinion? Reader comments will be printed in the May 2002 issue.

40-mm DIVISION AIR DEFENSE GUN: DIVAD (SGT. YORK)

by Irene Willhite

The American ships and planes that carried military supplies to Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war did not return empty—a great espionage prize, a captured Russian super-weapon called the ZSU-23-4 or SHILKA was brought to a gunnery range at Fort Bliss, Texas.[2] Although it looked like a small tank, it was a radar-directed, computer-controlled anti-aircraft cannon.[2] In a series of tests codenamed HITVAL, SHILKA performed poorly: fire-control computers were inaccurate, slow and unable to hit aircraft maneuvering targets.

In a 1982 article published in Atlantic Monthly, Gregg Easterbrook noted the SHILKA was not the decisive super-weapon many had feared, but U.S. Army officials were envious nonetheless.[2] The 40-mm DIVAD was intended to replace the 1960 vintage VULCAN 20-mm anti-aircraft gun which provided air defense for the Army's tanks and fighting vehicles. . .the "forward maneuver elements" of the Army's "heavy" divisions. VULCAN offered little defense against enemy aircraft. The Division Air Defense Gun's (DIVAD) complexity was provoked by the Army's dream of mounting a technological response to the threat posed by "all-weather" aircraft equipped with radars and electronic sensors that supposedly enable them to attack tanks in the dead of night or through clouds. . .giving DIVAD radars and computers would enable it to fire back under the same conditions.[2] Even the U.S. Air Force, with the world's most advanced electronics, seldom flies missions in bad weather because it is difficult and dangerous to do so—even in the absence of enemy fire. The Army's claim it needed a mega-dollar radar cannon to shoot down helicopters strains credulity. In Vietnam 4,643 helicopters were lost; nearly all of them were lost to rifles and machine guns carried on the backs of the Viet Cong.

The one electronic system that did pose a threat to Army tanks is a night-sight called FLIR, for "forward-looking infrared" that allows pilots to see a small slice of ground in front of them—almost as if it were daylight. Systems such as FLIR can "see" aircraft at longer ranges and in worse weather than the naked eye—they do not have the range of radar nor can they typically cover a full 360 or even 180 degree sector.[3] Neither radar nor FLIR nor eyeballs can see through hills, buildings, or to a great extent, trees.

Eventually the DIVAD all weather rationale lost respect in the Pentagon, but a new presumed technological threat arose to take its place. . . missile firing helicopters. Col. Charles Clarke, a DIVAD project officer, said, "A majority of the targets DIVAD will engage will be helicopters." [2] The emphasis for providing air defense for front line armored forces has shifted from countering fighter-bombers to defeating standoff helicopters, although the need to counter fixed-wing aircraft still existed.

Because of the "perceived" fast-growing Soviet threat, in the mid-70s U.S. military leaders decided on a new way of doing business in order to expedite the development process. Two contractors would develop prototypes in an accelerated competition with minimum government overview. This acquisition strategy would reduce costs in the long run and cut development time to about one-half of that originally contemplated. [1] Another twist to the strategy was the use of off-the-shelf components. Colonel Russell Parker testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 1977), "We expect this somewhat unorthodox approach to permit a much reduced development time, thus resulting in an earliest fielding date, albeit with higher but acceptable risks. . . the manufacturer will be required by the fixed price warranty provisions, to correct deficiencies." [1]

According to a summary of the Army's request for proposals, the prototype was to have a range of at least 3 km, a reaction time of 5 sec, (later 8 sec), a FLIR sensor, a laser ranger, and an automatic fire-control system. It was to have a 50% probability of hitting a target at 3 km when firing a 30-round burst of bullets. The use of "mature components and subsystems" was a basic requirement of the DIVAD program in an effort to save time and money. [5] Several subsystems existed or modified existing components: radar, laser range finder, L70 cannons, attitude reference unit, plasma display, M48 chassis (Korean War), IFF, and gas turbine engine. [5] Colonel Parker unveiled the DIVAD plan to 49 industry representatives on 18 May 1977.

In January 1978 Ford was awarded a \$39.6 million contract to build a 40-mm prototype and a \$39.1 million contract to General Dynamics to develop a 35 mm prototype. [2] The contracts called for delivery in 29 months.

Easterbrook: Immediately the lobbying began. Ford had a marketing agreement with the Swedish firm Bofors, a maker of 40-mm but not 35-mm cannons; while Ford could have switched to a

35-mm weapon for DIVAD, the potential profits from a 40-mm weapon were higher. Department of Defense lawyers, the Army pleading to Congress, had advised that specifying the caliber of DIVAD's gun would be 'anti-competitive' and could lead to lawsuits - 'the most ludicrous excuse I've ever heard' a high-ranking Pentagon official had told me. When the final DIVAD requirements were issued, they called for a gun 'in the 30-mm to 40-mm range.[2]

In the Lessons Learned document, an analysis commentary titled "Program Risks of 'Skunk Works' Development," notes:

Decisions on system design and use were the complete responsibility of the system contractor. This freedom of action was provided to speed up the system acquisition process. Government system knowledge outside the PM [project manager] was limited to that gained during OTEA [Operational Test and Evaluation Agency], TECOM [U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command], or PM tests. Agencies such as TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command], DA [Department of Army], or DOD [Department of Defense] knew little of the system history needed to feel comfortable with contractor decisions.[5]

Unfortunately, information on how the DIVAD guns would actually perform was incomplete from the first test. Both contractors, after more than two years of work, unveiled their prototypes on schedule, June 1980 at the North McGregor Test Facility in the New Mexico part of Fort Bliss. They faced each other in a winner-take-all competition informally called the "shootoff at OK corral" by Army officials. Through the course of DT/OT II, the DIVAD contenders shot down two F-86 fighters, five Huey helicopters, and twenty-one small-scale drones. Both outperformed SHILKA. But, reports Easterbrook, "the Army never tested them in one critical area where SHILKA had failed: neither gun shot against a maneuvering target." [2]

The first contract, calling for 263 production systems over three years, was awarded in May 1981 to Ford Aerospace. It was then that the DIVAD gun system was officially named the Sergeant York (SGT YORK). Critics of the Army's choice of contractor charged that the competition had been fixed. Easterbrook wrote that Ford's gun was technically inferior to the General Dynamics' system but there was political pressure to give Ford Aerospace a

large defense contract. Its parent, Ford Motor Corp., had recorded in 1980 an annual loss of \$1.5 billion—the largest corporate deficit in U.S. history.[1] Ronald Reagan had campaigned against federal bailout of Chrysler Corp. He did not want a similar bailout of the nation's No. 2 automaker.

The General Dynamics Electric Boat subsidiary was in deep “acrimonious” debate with Admiral Hyman Rickover about who would take the blame for severe cost overruns in the Trident Submarine program. Stories critical of the General Dynamics' shipyards were appearing throughout the media. Secretary of Navy John Lehman announced, “future submarines would be built overseas to escape the clutches of General Dynamics.” General Dynamics was also negotiating to purchase the Chrysler subsidiary that builds the M-1 tank. Pentagon sources said General Dynamics seemed to have been presented with the following terms: “Take a fall on DIVAD in relief on Electric Boat's cost overruns and clearance to buy the M-1 plant.” By autumn of 1981, Electric Boat disappeared from the headlines of the nation's papers and a further Trident contract was awarded . . . early in 1982, General Dynamics bought the M-1 plant.[2]

On Ford's team were four recently retired three-star Army generals who had many friends in the Pentagon: Lt. Gens. Eugene D'Ambrosio, Robert Baer, Howard Cooksey, and C.J. LeVan. Both D'Ambrosio, who retired from the Army in May of 1980, and Baer, who retired in June of 1980, had been deputy commanders of DARCOM, the Army's weapons procurement branch. D'Ambrosio was now chairman of the board of Day & Zimmermann, a Ford-DIVAD subcontractor, and Baer was vice-president of XMCO, a consulting firm under contract to Ford. Cooksey, a consulting firm under contract to Ford, had been, before his retirement in December 1977, Deputy Chief of Research, Development and Acquisition, the Army's most influential high technology post. LeVan works for a defense consulting firm called R&D Associates, which is, in turn, under contract to Ford Aerospace. His last assignment, before his retirement in June of 1978, was as director of plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before that, he had been Commander of the Air Defense Center. It was under LeVan's direction that the ‘eight second’ requirement and others had been written. According to Pentagon sources, LeVan is one of the best

connected retired officers in Washington and was tireless in working his contracts on Ford's behalf. LeVan, however, denies performing any marketing tasks, saying he only gave technical advice to Ford.[2]

Late in 1981, Ford's gun was subjected to a "check test" that was supposed to show its deficiencies and shortcomings had been corrected. The most serious result of the check-test was information on the York's reaction time. Original specifications called for a 5-second reaction time. . .it was 9-seconds in the shootoff. This was a critical parameter. . .defined as follows: the gun is pointing 180° away from a target when the target breaks mask-that is, comes up from beyond a ridge line for example. Then the radar, searching at 1 revolution per second, and the computer must identify this as a potential target. The gun must be laid on the potential target and have a fire-control solution within 8 seconds.[1] The test summary divides reaction time into several sectors-unmask to detection, detection to designate, designate to lock, and lock to fire enable-and gives the median time for each. The total is 16.8 seconds with radar and 32.7 seconds with Ford's optical mode. . .the results were based on samples varying from 13 to 240 target presentations and varying mixes of helicopters and aircraft.[1]

In early 1984, the Army, with Congressional approval, committed to a test-fix-retest cycle to keep the system moving forward. Major General Maloney said, "The DIVAD battery-eight systems plus one spare-activated 1 November 1984, at Fort Bliss to prepare for tests, has been demonstrating 90% reliability for full systems capability. The systems have been able to operate in a degraded manner a further 2% of the time and have had an 8% inoperable rate." [3] However, in October 1984 Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger suggested to Congress that 1985 procurement funds be held up until further testing.[1] In 1985 John E. Kring, the Defense Department's new director of operational testing and evaluation, said the tests showed, "the SGT YORK was not operationally effective in adequately protecting friendly forces during simulated combat, even though its inherent capabilities provided improvement over the current [General Electric] Vulcan gun system. The SGT YORK was not operationally suitable because of its low availability during the tests.' [5]

On 27 August 1985, Secretary Weinberger killed the project. He said, “the tests demonstrated that while there are marginal improvements that can be made in the YORK gun, they are not worth the additional cost-so we will not invest any more funds in the system.[1] Maloney told Spectrum the “gun still had problems with software and electronic countermeasures, but my sensing was that it was certainly no worse than many weapon systems at this period in their gestation.”[1]

The costs involved in the DIVAD project have not been addressed in this paper. As the research on the evolution of the SGT YORK progressed, it became evident the large dollar amounts attached to the project may have been relevant to the government’s findings, but one is inclined to believe the problems associated with the development and eventual cancellation of the system go beyond dollars. Easterbrook notes, “one reason distorted projects can emerge from a system whose individual members are intelligent and generally well-intentioned, is the bureaucratic structure of the Pentagon itself. Multiple independent commands, which compete for attention and budget money, are encouraged to see themselves as the center of all things and their responsibilities to the larger scheme as a hindrance.”[2]

In Spectrum Adam writes:

Perhaps the biggest insight into why the SGT YORK gun died is gained from a look at its proposed replacement: an assemblage of missiles and guns linked by command, control, communications, and intelligence sensors. The air defense missiles would include a pedestal-mounted Stinger missile with a FLIR and laser range finder, a fiber-optic guided missile for targets beyond the line of sight and possibly a laser-guided short-range missile. The sensors, both active and passive types, would be mounted on ground and airborne platforms. A 25-mm gun, firing some 600 rounds per minute, is also planned. The YORK gun’s proposed \$11 billion successor, called the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) system is now before Congress.[1]

It would be difficult to assign any one cause to the cancellation of the project. The Army’s unique accelerated acquisition program did not provide for testing and evaluation sufficient to identify suitability and effectiveness before initial production was approved.

The Army successfully controlled costs until contract termination, which “suggests that the use of the fixed-price production contract options were cost effective. . .the drawback was the pressure on decision makers to proceed with production on schedule, despite technical difficulties, in order to take advantage of the favorable prices.”[2]

One may consider the basic problem with the whole project was in the awarding of the contract. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to come to any empirical conclusion as to the causes of the problems considering the complexities of the DIVAD project. One's first inclination is to consider that the awarding of the contract solved many problems for private industry. All the problems related to the project were by-products of an ill-conceived device that resulted in the bailout of Ford Motor Corp. and the cost overruns on the Trident by General Dynamics.

In the 28 March 1988 issue of Defense News, it was reported the Army's reject has become a pleasant surprise for the Navy. The features that made SGT YORK so promising as a battlefield weapon were its radar system, laser rangefinder, and computer. Richard Mark, head of the Electronic Warfare Laser/Optical Branch of the missile test center, said, “The Navy paid \$20,000 to have SGT YORK shipped to Point Magu, California, where it was to be used to acquire and track targets.”[4] In tests during the past year, the SGT YORK has proven to be a “real good piece of equipment,” said Bob Hubbert, spokesman for the test center.[4]

This notion may appear too simplistic in light of such a large expensive project, but, given time and a strategy conducive to the accelerated acquisition program, an effective system may have evolved if the government had more of a hands-on approach rather than the “skunk works” strategy. On the other hand, an effective system may have evolved if ROC, RAM-D specifications and correlated training programs with TRADOC, had been firmly established in the development process. The contract specifications should have been adhered to by DOD. The Army's requirements for the gun were clear and appear as though they remained clear and unwavering throughout. Defense changed the rules as its perceptions of the strength of Soviet threat increased—whether this threat were real or not... causing great consternation to the contractor and those working on the project.

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Due East: The Story of the Transfer of the Czech Armament Industry to Slovakia

By Dr. Vladislav Kratky

As Czechoslovakia moved from democracy to communism in the years immediately following the end of World War II, the country's domestic affairs became increasingly dictated by external forces and interests. Indeed, the transfer of the Czech armament industry east to the Slovak lands was largely dictated by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European communist states.

The representatives of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Italy and France founded the "Information Bureau" as early as September 1947. Though historians never saw the complete documentation of this establishing meeting, it was a milestone in the dividing of the world into communist and democratic spheres.

It is certain from the view point of Czechoslovakia that most of the representatives being present decried the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) for its policy which aimed to cooperate with other democratic parties united in the so called National Front. As early as autumn 1947, a strong shift occurred in the internal political situation in Czechoslovakia and in February 1948 the KSC became the proprietor of uncontrolled power in the same manner as in other countries of Eastern Europe.

The next session of the Information Bureau was held in June 1948. The participants excluded the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for its political divergence with Stalin, and thus validated his theorem regarding class conflict growing in intensity. This also demonstrated that adherence to socialism entails blind obedience to the Soviet Union and its Communist Party. The Information Bureau session denounced the idea about possible separate routes of each of the countries to socialism as being a demonstration of bourgeois nationalism and labeled it as the biggest danger for the world communist movement. The bipolar dividing of the world had started up.

External forces brought about a re-orientation of the Czechoslovak economy. “We reckoned that world nuclear war breaks out no later than within the year 1954,” said Czechoslovak Prime Minister Viliam Siroky. He continued saying, “Yes, we took it into account as did the Soviet Union and Stalin. And based on the endless wait, considerable nervousness went arm-in-arm with growing mistrust. The American government applied a restraint to us equivalent to a blockade. We have broken all of the agreements as well as diplomatic customs. The reserves of non-ferrous metals had been exhausted. We purchased goods from the firms who were willing to break the embargo. For which we paid giant sums of cash.”

The change of economical orientation had been realized in the most crude form as compared to other East European countries. The new economical orientation did not result from the embargo only. Already in November 1948 the Information Bureau applied for the break of relations between the West and all socialist countries. One year later, other countries strongly criticized Czechoslovakia for defaulting on the agreement of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON). Shortly after, the Czechoslovak delegation retreated and proclaimed that its economic structure and foreign trade would be adapted to the demands of the other socialist states. Thus, the needs of this advanced industrialized country had been subordinated to the demands of the less advanced countries. In Czechoslovakia a build-up began in the heavy machinery industry while a regression began in the traditional manufacturing sectors of light and precision industry.

Most of these aforementioned facts which were not known to the Czechoslovak people directly struck the employees of Skoda Plzen in the years 1949-1950. Indeed, the people were still in shock from the events of February 1948, the fast changes in both foreign and domestic policy which had followed and the venomous political processes of the KSC. In addition, Plzen’s Skoda Works -- the largest armaments factory – was nationalized in 1948. However, no one dreamed of the vindictive hand of Stalin.

The people understood the deterioration of East – West relations primarily through massive propaganda which presented a “black and white” version that continuously showed the East as a peacemaker and the West as a war incendiary. From this, Plzen and its

Skoda were determined to lay within the Endangered Zone, an area vulnerable to attack from western imperialists.

The Central Committee of KSC summed up its own assessment of the situation as well as other speculations referring to the future of the armament industry. First, the members of the Central Committee determined that there was a great danger posed to the western part of the Republic from an invasion from the west which could also destroy arms production and its development base in Plzen. Second, the only solution to this threat was to transfer armaments production east as close as possible to the safe border of the USSR, ie. to Slovakia. By this way two objectives would be fulfilled: the safety of the armament factories would be assured and the industrial base of Slovakia would be supported by well experienced industrial cadres. With these points, the KSC manipulated public opinion.

Wasn't it excellent propaganda?! Nobody could suspect the real reasons of this prepared strategic riddle. First, the plan disintegrated the pre-war armament imperium of Skoda which had remained independent from those in power and from Moscow even after nationalization. Second, the transfer of the center of the Czechoslovak armament industry to as close as possible to the border of the USSR was not for protection against an attack coming from the West but for a possible annexation of Czechoslovak lands by the USSR.

On the basis of broad political considerations and analyses, the members of the Central Committee and state officers started a whole range of measures to transfer the armament industry to Slovakia. These measures, mainly their effectual consequences, changed the way of living of hundreds of people for a long time.

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Dr. Vladislav Kratky is Director of the Skoda Museum in Plzen, Czech Republic, which preserves the history of the famed Skoda Works manufacturing concern in the Czech Republic. Dr. Kratky is the author of several books and articles about the history of Skoda.

USS Pueblo Incident

By Bill Craig, Contributing Editor

One of the most dangerous confrontations of the Cold War took place on January 23, 1968, when a U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering ship, the *Pueblo*, was fired upon and seized by North Korean naval vessels in the Sea of Japan off the Korean coast. American statements that the vessel was in international waters were disputed by the North Koreans who claimed that the ship was conducting espionage in their territory.

The ship was confiscated by the North Koreans, but the 82 surviving crew members and its captain, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, were finally released on Dec. 22, 1968, after U.S. officials signed a document apologizing for the alleged spying and promising not to do it again. In an unprecedented action, the United States declared the document false before signing it. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the North Koreans apparently believed they were reaping some propaganda value nonetheless. The U.S. disclaimer reiterated the American view that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity and that it had not at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea. President Lyndon Johnson said the crew's detention was totally unjustified.

After their return, an Army physician who examined the crewmen said they showed signs of recent maltreatment. Commander Bucher said he and other crew members had been beaten by their captors with fists, boards and clubs, and that he had been held in solitary confinement for the entire 11 months of captivity. He said North Korea was country "completely devoid of humanity, completely devoted to enslavement of men's minds." He later described in detail the physical and psychological ordeals he and his crew had suffered. He said at one point a North Korean officer had taken him to see a horribly tortured man who was near death.

A navy court of inquiry on the ship's seizure later heard testimony from 104 witnesses. Commander Bucher told the court that the *Pueblo* had been "seized" and had not surrendered, and that he had been ordered not to uncover the ship's guns and start a war. He said he had been informed prior to his mission that support would not be available in

case his ship was attacked. He said he considered the crew to have represented their nation in an outstanding manner. Crew members related how they had signed "confessions" under duress and the fear that they might be compelled to reveal vital intelligence if they resisted. One crew member was killed as the North Koreans attacked the boat, and his body was returned when the crew was released.

Texas Towers #2,#3, and #4 "Old Shaky"

By Donald Slutzky



On January 15, 1961, a North American Air Defense Command Radar Platform called Texas Tower #4, which was 78 miles due East of Barnegat Inlet, toppled into the Atlantic Ocean during a hurricane strength winter gale. America lost 28 brave volunteers, 14 military and 14 civilians. Only two bodies were recovered. These Radar Islands were our main defense against Soviet attack on the Eastern Coast of the USA, the D.E.W. line of N.O.R.A.D . The disaster was widely reported in the press, but the government would not comment. There was a degree of secrecy by the Government surrounding these Towers, as a result these brave Americans never received any recognition. These victims of the Cold War were ordinary American citizens, doing their duty so that all Americans were safeguarded from enemy attack. These volunteers knew the possibility existed that they might never return. When asked by their government, they volunteered to help their Country, neighbors, and families, to make sure we remained "Safe". To this day, they have not received Recognition or even Acknowledgment from Our Government for their Heroic actions and sacrifices. There were four "Others" who also perished in the line of "duty", in separate incidents aboard the other Texas Towers in the North Atlantic, that have not been "recognized". A total of 32.

LEST WE FORGET! Anyone with information concerning this Cold War disaster, our efforts to gain recognition, and/or the whereabouts of the victims' families, is asked to contact:

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Visit us at www.texastower.org

Cold War Tourist

Public Can Now Tour Top-Secret Nuclear Shelter for Congress

By Contributing Editor Bill Craig

The workmen must have wondered why so much concrete and steel was needed to build the new West Virginia wing on the Greenbrier Resort complex in West Virginia when it was under construction about 1960. They and the public found out 30 years later when it was revealed that they were actually building a huge underground bunker to house members of Congress in case of a nuclear attack.

The size of two football fields on top of each other, the Government Relocation Facility, as it was called, was buried 720 feet into the hillside at the luxury resort at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, about 200 miles southwest of Washington, D.C. Now private parties can feast on fancy foods where the Senate and House of Representatives

would have met to cope with the grave problems of a national emergency. Since 1995 the bunker has been open for public tours.

The complex was planned under the Eisenhower Administration at the height of the Cold War and was intended to house the 535 lawmakers and 550 top staff members. It was code-named "Project Greek Island," and was built between 1958 and 1961. There are four entrances to the shelter, two of them large enough for vehicles, each protected by a massive steel and concrete door weighing from 18 to 30 tons and designed to withstand a nuclear blast 15 to 30 miles away.

Decontamination chambers were located near the two main entrances. There, individuals exposed to radioactive fallout would enter the area, dispose of their contaminated clothing, wash down with soap and water, and be issued a set of fatigues or overalls, footwear and undergarments.

There are 153 rooms in the facility, which occupies a total of 112,544 square feet of space in the two levels. There were 18 dormitories equipped with bunk beds and communal showers. There is a self-contained power plant capable of providing all necessary needs for 1,100 people for up to 40 days. A 400-seat cafeteria was served by a kitchen with a 60-day stockpile of provisions.

A communications area included a conference/briefing room and a television production area, among other facilities. A 600-square-foot room was designed to hold vital documents, as well as small arms and riot gear. A nuclear-biological-chemical storage room was used to house protective items. A completely-equipped dispensary/clinic contained a 12-bed ward, medical and dental operating rooms, and examination rooms. An incinerator was also provided to dispose of waste and act as a crematorium in case some of the occupants died. Radiation detectors on surrounding mountain tops could automatically seal off the entire shelter.

Two large underground chambers, used as conference rooms by the connecting hotel, were intended for sessions of the two houses of Congress. A 16,544-square-foot exhibit hall leading from the hotel proper was designated as work space for congressional staff. Over

the years it was used by thousands of guests and hotel employees for various functions, without their knowing they had actually entered part of the bunker.

The facility was kept in a constant state of readiness for 30 years, with food stocks rotated through the hotel. A small cadre of government employees were assigned to the facility, working as “Forsythe Associates.” A television repair shop located off the exhibit hall served as part of the cover for the communication specialists.

Existence of the bunker was a closely held secret until May 31, 1992, when an article in *The Washington Post* exposed it. The day after the story was published the facility began to be phased out, and in 1995 the lease between the government and the Greenbrier was terminated. Almost all of the equipment and furnishings were removed and reassigned to other government facilities. Some of the rooms have been restored to show visitors.

Public tours of the facility are now conducted Wednesdays and Sundays at 1:15 p.m. from the White Sulphur Springs Civic Center. Tour tickets are \$15 per adult and \$10 per child (ages 10-18) from January 2 through March 31. Tickets are \$25 and \$15 from April through December. Children under age 10 are not permitted on tours. For more information, call the Greenbrier at 304-536-1110.

